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THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978:
DOES IT APPLY TO THE ADOPTION OF
AN ILLEGITIMATE INDIAN
CHILD?
Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA),1 in re-
sponse to a crisis2 in which public and private agencies removed Indian chil-
dren from their homes more frequently than non-Indian children.' The
ICWA seeks to remedy this disparity of placement in foster homes and adop-
tive homes by providing the Indian child's tribe with jurisdiction 4 and a sys-
tem of intervention5 in child custody proceedings. Furthermore, the ICWA
establishes a placement preference guide for agencies placing Indian children
in adoptive or foster homes.6
Since the enactment of the ICWA, several courts have determined the ap-
plicability of the ICWA to different fact situations.7 The Kansas Supreme
1. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(1982)).
2. Representative Udall acknowledged this crisis in a statement before the House of Rep-
resentatives. 124 CONG. REC. 38,102 (1978). The Senate also identified this crisis during hear-
ings held on Apr. 8 and 9, 1974, and Aug. 4, 1977. See generally Indian Child Welfare Act of
1977: Hearing Before the United States Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs on S 1214,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Hearing] (statement of Virgil Gunn, Chair-
man of the Health, Education, and Welfare Comm. of the Colville Business Council); Indian
Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1975) [hereinafter 1974 Hearing]
(statement of William Byler, Executive Director, Ass'n on American Indian Affairs (AAIA)).
3. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 538-603 (1976 survey conducted by the AAIA);
1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 72-94, 231-52; Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A
Critical Analysis, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1288 n.14 (1980) (summarizing the AAIA's
surveys).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)-(b) (1982).
5. Id. § 1911(c).
6. Id. § 1915.
7. See Native Village of Stevens v. Smith, 770 F.2d 1486, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985) (foster
care agreements between states and tribes are voluntary), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986);
Village of Chalkyitsik v. M.S.F., 690 P.2d 10, 16 (Alaska 1984) (Indian tribes have a protected
interest in placement of Indian children, and therefore, have a right to intervene in adoption
proceeding); E.A. v. State (In re J.R.S.), 623 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Alaska 1981) (preference of
grandparents for placement of Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) gives them a right to intervene in adoptive proceedings of the child); In re Appeal
Juvenile Action, 130 Ariz. 202, 206, 635 P.2d 187, 191 (Ct. App. 1981) (illegitimate child born
to minor Indian mother, who lived on reservation, is considered to be domiciled on reservation
for purposes of ICWA), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Department of Social Servs. v.
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Court, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., s addressed the applicability of the
ICWA to illegitimate Indian children placed for adoption with non-Indian
families. In this decision, the Kansas court developed the "existing Indian
family" theory. Applying this theory, the court avoided the placement pref-
erences of the ICWA by determining that the ICWA required a breakup of
an existing Indian family before it applied.9 Therefore, the ICWA was inap-
plicable where an unwed, non-Indian mother voluntarily consented to the
adoption of her newborn Indian infant by a non-Indian family because such
an adoption failed to break up an existing Indian family.' ° Expanding the
reasoning of the Kansas court, the Indiana Supreme Court in J. Q. v. D.R.L.,
(In re Adoption of TR.M) " held that an adoption of a newborn Indian
infant by a non-Indian family with the consent of an Indian mother also
failed to break up an existing Indian family. Therefore, the ICWA was
inapplicable. 12
Diana L., (In re Junious M.), 144 Cal. App. 3d 786, 798, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 47 (1983)'(ICWA
is not applicable until the status of the child as an Indian is established); In re S.A.M., 703
S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (ICWA not applicable in termination of putative Indian
father's parental rights); In re M.E.M., 195 Mont. 329, 335, 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (1981)
(ICWA requires appointment of counsel for indigent Indian parents in child custody proceed-
ings); In re Bertelson, 189 Mont. 524, 531, 617 P.2d 121, 125 (1980) (ICWA does not apply to
custody disputes between non-Indian parents and Indian grandparents); State ex rel. Dep't of
Human Servs. v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500, 502, 660 P.2d 590, 592 (ICWA is not applicable in
paternity determination and child support enforcement proceedings), cert. denied and appeal
dismissed, 464 U.S. 803 (1983); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Charles (In re Charles), 70 Or.
App. 10, 14-15, 688 P.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (showing of unsuccessful remedial services as
required by § 1912(d) of ICWA need not be made before removal of child), review dismissed en
banc, 299 Or. 341, 701 P.2d 1052 (1985); In re Adoption of K.L.R.F., 356 Pa. Super. 555, 562-
63, 515 A.2d 33, 37 (1986) (ICWA allows adoptive Indian parents to withdraw their consent to
a preadoptive or foster care placement), appeal dismissed, 516 Pa. 520, 533 A.2d 708 (1987); In
re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 970 (Utah 1986) (removal of Indian child from reser-
vation for purpose of adoption does not change the child's domicile for purposes of determin-
ing jurisdiction under ICWA); In re Custody of S.B.R., 43 Wash. App. 622, 626, 719 P.2d 154,
156 (ICWA requires that notice be given to Indian tribe of an involuntary proceeding involving
a custody dispute between parents and grandparents), review denied, 108 Wash. 2d 1009
(1986).
8. 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168 (1982).
9. Id. at 205-06, 643 P.2d at 175.
10. Id. at 207, 643 P.2d at 176. Several other courts followed the Kansas Supreme
Court's reasoning: the Arizona Court of Appeals in In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 136
Ariz. 528, 532, 667 P.2d 228, 232 (Ct. App. 1983) (involving non-Indian mother and Indian
father); the Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1063
(Okla. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1042 (1988); the Missouri Court of Appeals in In
re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (same); and the South Dakota Supreme
Court in Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 653 (S.D. 1987) (same). For further discussion of
the existing Indian family theory, see infra notes 86-142, 155-68 and accompanying text.
11. 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988).
12. Id. at 303.
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The following day, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re
Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 13 rejected the existing Indian family
theory by holding that the ICWA applied to illegitimate Indian children vol-
untarily relinquished to a non-Indian family shortly after birth.
Prior to the decisions of the Indiana and New Jersey courts, Senator
Daniel Evans introduced amendments to the ICWA in the Senate on Decem-
ber 19, 1987."4 On May 11, 1988, the Select Committee on Indian Affairs
held a hearing on the amendments. The amendments were intended primar-
ily to clarify and expand coverage of the ICWA and to increase tribal in-
volvement and control over the adoption of Indian children. 5 Second, the
amendments were proposed to make placement preferences mandatory, and
thereby keep families intact whenever possible.16 Finally, these amendments
were aimed at ensuring more fair and expeditious placement proceedings,
and at establishing compliance monitoring mechanisms.' 7 These amend-
ments, if enacted as introduced, would remove any doubt that the ICWA
applies to adoptions of illegitimate Indian children voluntarily relinquished
shortly after birth.
This Comment first examines the provisions of the ICWA in light of its
legislative history. Then, this Comment analyzes the line of cases holding
that the ICWA is not applicable to adoptions of illegitimate Indian children
given up at birth, and contrasts that line of cases with the opposing New
Jersey approach. Next, this Comment contends that the New Jersey ap-
proach, by applying the ICWA to adoption proceedings involving illegiti-
mate Indian children relinquished at birth, adheres more closely to
congressional intent manifest in the ICWA. Finally, this Comment con-
cludes by proposing that Congress enact those sections of the proposed 1987
amendments that clarify the applicability of the ICWA to illegitimate Indian
children.
13. 111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925 (1988).
14. S. 1976, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S18,532 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1987)
[hereinafter Amendments]. At the time of publication, the amendments had not been reintro-
duced. However, the Select Committee on Indian Affairs had scheduled another hearing for
April 20, 1989, to discuss the civil rights issue. This Comment will note the pertinent changes
that would be made by the amendments, if enacted, to the ICWA.
15. Id. at S18,538.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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I. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978
A. The Crisis1 8
The rate at which public and private agencies separate Indian children
from their homes is significantly more frequent than for non-Indian children.
Surveys conducted by the Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA)
illustrate the disparity that exists between the placement of Indian and non-
Indian children in adoptive and foster care homes.19 On average, an esti-
mated one out of twenty-four Indian children are adopted compared to one
18. The legislative history of the ICWA characterizes as a crisis the disparity between the
separation of Indian children from their families compared to non-Indian children. See H.R.
REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 7530, 7531-32 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1386]; 124 CONG. REC. 38,102 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Udall). See generally Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981) [hereinafter 1978 Hearing]; 1977Hearing, supra note 2, at
261; 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 15.
19. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 538-603; 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 72-94, 231-
52; see also H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 7530, 7531. Below is a compilation of the results of the study prepared by the
AAIA.
Indian Children in Adoptive and Foster Care
Rate of Indians Rate of Indians in Foster
Adopted to Non-Indians Care to Non-Indians
State (percent) (percent)
Alaska 460 300
Arizona 420 270
California 840 270
Idaho 1110 640
Maine 100 1910
Michigan 370 710
Minnesota 390 1650
Montana 480 1280
Nevada 100 700
New Mexico 150 240
New York 330 300
North Dakota 280 2010
Oklahoma 440 390
Oregon 110 820
South Dakota 160 2240
Utah 340 1500
Washington 1880 960
Wisconsin 1790 1340
Wyoming 400 1040
1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 539.
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out of ninety non-Indian children.2° This is nearly four times the non-In-
dian adoption rate. Many of these adoptions occur prior to the Indian
child's first birthday.2' For instance, in Minnesota between 1971 and 1972,
unrelated families adopted nearly one in every four Indian children under
one year of age, compared to one in every thirty-seven non-Indian children
under one year of age.22
Similarly, one out of fifty Indian children are placed in foster care homes
compared to one out of two hundred ninety-four non-Indian children.23
This is nearly six times the non-Indian placement rate. As a result of these
placement rates, approximately twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all In-
dian children are placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions.24
Non-Indian families adopted or provided foster care to eighty-five percent of
these children.25
In a number of instances, the placement of Indian children in non-Indian
homes resulted in dramatic effects on the children, as illustrated by the testi-
mony before the Subcommittee of Indian Affairs in the 1974 and 1977 hear-
ings." When raised in non-Indian homes, Indian children experience more
social problems in adolescence and adulthood.2 7 Specifically, Dr. Carl Min-
20. Barsh, supra note 3, at 1289 n.14 (weighted average of the adoption rate for Indian
children and for non-Indian children in 19 states).
21. 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 568-603. The AAIA's survey found the median age of
Indian children at the time of adoption to be as follows: Michigan-5.4 months; Minnesota-5.3
months; North Dakota-2 months; Oregon-3.9 months; South Dakota-2.5 months; Utah-less
than 1 month; and Washington-3.6 months. Id.
22. 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 15, 76-79.
23. Barsh, supra note 3, at 1289 n. 14 (weighted average of the foster care placement rate
for Indian children and for non-Indian children in 19 states).
24. See 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 15; H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 9,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7530, 7531.
25. See 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 17; H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 9,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7531. The AAIA found the
percentage of Indian children adopted by non-Indian families to be as follows: Alaska-93%;
California-92.5%; Idaho-88%; Minnesota-97.5%; Montana-87%; North Dakota-75%; and
Washington-69%. 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 541-603. For Yakima children, non-Indian
families adopted 75% of the adopted Indian children. 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 120, 123-
28. Non-Indian families adopted 61% of the adopted Indian children at the Rosebud Sioux
reservation. Id. at 155-56.
26. See generally 1977 Hearing, supra note 2; 1974 Hearing, supra note 2.
27. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 77 (statement of Bertram Hirsch, AAIA); 1974
Hearing, supra note 2, at 46-47 (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, Dep't of Psychiatry,
Univ. of Minnesota); id. at 113-14 (prepared statement of Dr. James Shore, Director of Com-
munity Psychiatry Training Program and Assoc. Professor of Psychiatry, Dep't of Psychiatry,
Univ. of Oregon Medical School and William Nicolls, M.S.W., Director of Health, Welfare
and Social Services, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation); id. at 117-18
(statement of Mel Sampson, Northwest Affiliated Tribes presenting a statement by Don
Morrison).
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dell and Dr. Alan Gurwitt, both from the American Academy of Child Psy-
chiatry, testified that Indian children raised in non-Indian homes
experienced "ethnic confusion" and a "pervasive sense of abandonment" as
a result of being treated as non-Indians during childhood and then as Indi-
ans during adolescence.28  Further, some studies indicate that separation of
Indian children from their Indian families correlates with a higher incidence
of alcohol abuse and higher suicide rates within the Indian community.29
Congress found that cultural bias against Indians contributed to the high
rate of placements 30 in that non-Indian caseworkers were insensitive to, or
ignorant of, traditional Indian values. 3 1 Such caseworkers often misinter-
preted Indian behavior to be neglect or abuse of the Indian child, especially
where that behavior differed from middle-class, non-Indian behavior.32 In
addition, state caseworkers often failed to recognize the concept of the ex-
tended family.33 An Indian extended family may consist of grandparents,
aunts, uncles, brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, and first and second cous-
ins. 34 Applying the concept of the nuclear family, caseworkers frequently
viewed leaving the child with a member of the extended family as neglect. 35
In addition, caseworkers often relied on other factors such as poverty, poor
housing, lack of modem plumbing, overcrowding and alcoholism to deter-
mine the Indian's fitness as a parent.3 6 As a consequence of this cultural
28. 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 114; see also 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 56.
29. See 1978 Hearing, supra note 18, at 53 (statement of Rick Lavis, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Interior); 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 156-57
(prepared statement of the Nat'l Tribal Chairmen's Ass'n); 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 28
(statement of William Byler, Executive Director, AAIA).
30. See 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 17-21 (statement of William Byler, Executive Di-
rector, AAIA); id. at 95 (excerpt from the Indian Affairs, AAIA newsletter, June-Aug. 1968);
H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 7530, 7532; 124 CONG. REC. 38,102 (1978) (statements of Rep. Udall and Rep.
Lagomarsino); Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67,584, 67,593 (1979) [hereinafter Guidelines].
31. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 281 (prepared statement of the Nez Perce Tribal
Executive Comm.); id. at 140 (prepared statement of Dr. Marlene Echohawk, Nat'l Congress
of Am. Indians); id. at 266 (prepared statement of Virgil Gunn, Chairman of the Health,
Education, and Welfare Comm. of the Colville Business Council); id. at 316 (prepared state-
ment of Howard E. Tommie, Chairman of the Nat'l Indian Health Bd.).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 10-11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7532-33; Guidelines, supra note 30, at 67,593.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 10, 20, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7532, 7542.
34. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (1982).
35. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 316-17 (statement of Howard E. Tommie, Chair-
man of the Nat'l Indian Health Bd.); H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 10, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7532.
36. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 2, at 140 (prepared statement of Dr. Marlene
Echohawk, Nat'l Congress of Am. Indians); id. at 317 (statement of Howard E. Tommie,
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bias, more separations of Indian children from their families occurred than
of non-Indian children from their families.
In the eyes of many federal legislators, these separations occurred at a
"highly unwarranted" and "often unnecessary" rate.37 To rectify this situa-
tion, Congress enacted the ICWA.3 8 In the findings of the ICWA, 39 Con-
gress declared that it had the power to enact this legislation,"' and that it
had a responsibility to do so.4 Further, Congress acknowledged that it had
assumed the responsibility to protect Indian children 42 against unwarranted
and unnecessary removal from their families and against the alarmingly high
rate of placement into non-Indian homes. 43 Congress also found that non-
Indian public and private agencies separating Indian children from their
families failed to recognize the unique cultural and social standards of the
Chairman of the Nat'l Indian Health Bd.); 1974 Hearing, supra note 2, at 19 (statement of
William Byler, Executive Director, AAIA); H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 10, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7532.
37. 124 CONG. REC. 38,102 (1978) (statements of Rep. Udall and Rep. Lagomarsino).
See generally 1978 Hearing, supra note 18; 1977 Hearing, supra note 2; 1974 Hearing, supra
note 2; H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 7530, 7530.
38. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(1982)).
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1901. The 1987 amendments to the ICWA would add the following
finding:
(6) that the Bureau of Indian Affairs, exercising federal authority over Indian af-
fairs, has often failed to fulfill its trust responsibility to Indian tribes by failing to
advocate rigorously the position of tribes with States and non-tribal public and pri-
vate agencies and by failing to seek funding and planning necessary for tribes to
effectively fulfill their responsibilities to Indian children.
Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,533.
40. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1). The finding states: "[C]lause 3, section 8, article I of the United
States Constitution provides that 'The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate Commerce
* * * with Indian tribes' and, through this and other constitutional authority, Congress has
plenary power over Indian affairs." Id.
41. Id. § 1901(2). This section states: "Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the gen-
eral course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection and
preservation of Indian tribes and their resources." Id.; see also 124 CONG. REC. 38,102 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Udall); id. at 38,103 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino).
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3). This section provides "that there is no resource that is more vital
to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the
United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members
of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe." Id.; see also 124 CONG. REC. 38,102
(1978) (statement of Rep. Udall); id. at 38,103 (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino).
43. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4). This section provides "that an alarmingly high percentage of
Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them
by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such chil-
dren are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions." Id.; see also 124
CONG. REC. 38,102 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall); id. at 38,103 (statement of Rep.
Lagomarsino).
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Indian community.44 Furthermore, Congress declared that the policy of the
nation is "to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families.",45 To accomplish its
purpose, Congress established "minimum federal standards" for the removal
of Indian children from their homes" and a system of preferences for plac-
ing such children with families reflecting the "unique values of Indian
culture."47
B. The Provisions of the ICWA
The ICWA operates where an Indian child is the subject of a child custody
proceeding.48 Pursuant to section 1903 of the ICWA, child custody
proceedings 49 include foster care placement,50 termination of parental
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5). This section provides "that the States, exercising their recog-
nized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial
bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families." Id.; see also 124
CONG. REc. 38,102 (1978) (statements of Rep. Udall and Rep. Lagomarsino).
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. The amendments to the ICWA would declare Congress' intent to
promote an Indian child's relationship with his tribe by adding the following purpose: "to
protect the right of Indian children to develop a tribal identity and to maintain ties to the
Indian community within a family where their Indian identity will be nurtured." Amend-
ments, supra note 14, at S18,533.
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1902; see id. §§ 1911-1914.
47. Id. § 1902; see id. § 1915.
48. See In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 136 Ariz. 528, 531, 667 P.2d 228, 231 (Ct.
App. 1983); Angus v. Joseph (In re Application of Angus), 60 Or. App. 546, 549, 655 P.2d
208, 210 (1982),petition denied, 294 Or. 569, 660 P.2d 683, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983);
In re K.A.B.E., 325 N.W.2d 840, 842 (S.D. 1982); see also Levine, The Indian Child Welfare
Act: Federal Indian Law in State Probate Court Proceedings, 65 MICH. B.J. 452, 454 (1986);
McMullen, Preserving the Indian Family, CHILDREN'S LEGAL RIGHTS J. May/June 1981, at
32, 35; Trentadue & DeMontigny, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Practitioner's
Perspective, 62 N.D.L. REV. 487, 503 (1986); Wamser, Child Welfare Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: A New Mexico Focus, 10 N.M.L. REV. 413, 419-22 (1980). See generally
Guidelines, supra note 30, at 67,586-90.
49. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). The 1987 amendments to the ICWA would add the following
language to the definition of a child custody proceeding to "include any proceeding referred to
in this subsection involving an Indian child regardless of whether the child has previously lived
in Indian Country, in an Indian cultural environment or with an Indian parent." Amend-
ments, supra note 14, at S18,533. This additional language, if enacted, would overrule the
theory developed by several courts that Congress did not intend for the ICWA to apply unless
a breakup of an "existing Indian family" occurred. See generally infra notes 86-142, 155-68
and accompanying text (cases developing existing Indian family theory).
50. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l)(i). The ICWA defines foster care placement as:
[A]ny action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for tem-
porary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conser-
vator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon
demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated.
Id. The 1987 amendments to the ICWA would change the definition of foster care placement
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rights,51 preadoptive placement, 52 and adoptive placement.5 3 The ICWA
specifically excludes from child custody proceedings placements resulting
from an act of the child that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult54 and placements resulting from a divorce proceeding." The ICWA
defines "Indian child" as an unmarried person less than eighteen years old
who is either a member, or eligible for membership, of an Indian tribe.56
Once these threshold requirements are met, the other provisions of the
ICWA apply."
to mean "any administrative, adjudicatory or dispositional action, including a voluntary pro-
ceeding under section 103 of this Act, which may result in the placement of an Indian child in
a foster home or institution, group home or the home of a guardian or conservator." Amend-
ments, supra note 14, at S18,533.
51. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii). The ICWA defines termination of parental rights as "any
action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship." Id. The 1987 amend-
ments to the ICWA would change this definition to "any adjudicatory or dispositional action,
including a voluntary proceeding under section 103 of this Act, which may result in the termi-
nation of the parent child relationship or the permanent removal of the child from the parent's
custody." Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,533.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l)(iii). The ICWA defines preadoptive placement as "the temporary
placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the termination of parental
rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive placement." Id The 1987 amendments would not
change this definition. Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,533.
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iv). The ICWA defines adoptive placement as "the permanent
placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree of
adoption." Id. The 1987 amendments would revise this definition to include "any administra-
tive, adjudicatory or dispositional action or any voluntary proceeding under section 103 of this
Act, whether the placement is made by a public or private agency or by individuals." Amend-
ments, supra note 14, at S18,533.
54. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). The Bureau of Indian Affairs clarified the meaning of "an act
which would be a crime if committed by an adult" by affirmatively stating in the regulations
promulgated under the ICWA that "status offenses, such as truancy, [and] incorrigibility" are
not such acts. Therefore, placements which result from status offenses are child custody pro-
ceedings under the ICWA. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2(b)(5) (1988); see also Guidelines, supra note 30, at
67,587.
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). The 1987 amendments would clarify this exclusion: "[Child
custody proceeding] shall also not include a placement based upon an award of custody to one
of the parents in any proceeding involving a custody contest between the parents. All other
child custody proceedings involving family members are covered by this Act." Amendments,
supra note 14, at S18,533.
56. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). If the child is not a member of an Indian tribe, but is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe, then the child must also be the biological child of an Indian
tribe member. Id. The 1987 amendments would further provide that "if a child is an infant he
or she is considered to be part of a tribal community if either parent is so considered."
Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,534.
57. See sources cited supra note 48. But see infra notes 86-142, 155-68 and accompanying
text (discussion of cases requiring a third prerequisite, a breakup of an existing Indian family).
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1. Minimum Federal Standards
To accomplish the purposes of the ICWA, Congress set forth several pro-
visions with respect to jurisdiction of a tribal court to allow the Indian tribe
effective participation in child custody proceedings.58 First, the ICWA pro-
vides that an Indian tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody
proceeding involving an Indian child who is either residing or domiciled59
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1911.
59. Id. § 1911 (a). Congress failed to define "resides" and "domiciled." Further, the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs decided that existing state law already defined these terms, therefore,
they declined to define "resides" and "domiciled" in the regulations. See Indian Child Welfare
Act; Implementation, 44 Fed. Reg. 45,096, 45,100 (1979) [hereinafter Final Rules]; Guide-
lines, supra note 30, at 67,585.
The issue of whether an Indian child, whose parents live on the reservation, resides or is
domiciled on the reservation when the Indian child is born off the reservation and has never
been physically present on the reservation, was decided by the Supreme Court in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 57 U.S.L.W. 4409 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1989).
This case involved the adoption of illegitimate Indian twins by the Holyfields, a non-Indian
family. Both the Indian mother and Indian father consented to the adoption. Id. at 4411.
Furthermore, the Indian mother left the reservation for the sole purpose of having the babies,
intending to return, and in fact returning to the reservation thereafter. Id. The twins, how-
ever, did not return to the reservation with their mother. Id.
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that state law defines the term "domicile." Applying
state law, the court decided that where the Indian child is born off the reservation and has
never been physically present on the reservation, the child neither resides nor is domiciled on
the reservation, even though his natural parents reside and are domiciled on the reservation.
Id. The court reasoned that the state domicile rule, that domicile of minor children follows
that of the parents, failed to apply in this case because the Indian mother voluntarily surren-
dered and legally abandoned the twins to the adoptive parents off the reservation. Id. By so
holding, the court's new definition of domicile subverted the federal scheme under the ICWA
of promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.
By a 6-3 majority, the Supreme Court reversed the Mississippi Supreme Court decision. Id.
at 4415. The majority held that Congress intended a uniform federal law of domicile to be
used under the ICWA. Id. In supporting its conclusion, the majority first stated that the
purpose of the ICWA clearly suggested that Congress did not intend to rely on a state's defini-
tion of such a "critical term." Id. Second, Congress could not have intended to allow forum
shopping to avoid unfavorable state-law definitions of domicile. Id. Further, the majority held
that "domicile" should be given its ordinary meaning. Id. at 4413-14. Under this definition,
an illegimate child could not have a domicile in a place where the child had never been. Id. at
4414. The majority also found the minority view that abandonment of the child changes the
child's domicile to that of a person who stands in loco parentis inconsistent with Congress'
intent to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes. Id. The majority therefore re-
jected the reasoning of the Mississippi court and vacated the state's adoption decree. Id. at
4415.
The 1987 amendments would define domicile as:
'[D]omicile' shall be defined by the tribal law or custom of the Indian child's tribe,
or in the absence of such law or custom by Federal common law applied in a manner
which recognizes that (1) many Indian people consider their reservation to be their
domicile even when absent for extended periods and (2) the intent of the Act is to
defer to tribal jurisdiction whenever possible. Amendments, supra note 14, at
§ 18,533. This definition of domicile would be consistent with the Supreme Court's
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within that tribe's reservation or is a ward of the tribal court.60
However, where the Indian child fails to meet the requirement of residing
or being domiciled within the reservation, the tribal court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the state court over child custody proceedings involving
foster care placement or termination of parental rights.61 The ICWA re-
quires a state court to transfer the proceeding to the tribal court upon peti-
tion by either parent, 62 the Indian custodian of the child,6 or the Indian
child's tribe,"' unless either parent objects65 or the state court finds good
definition of domicile in Holyfield, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4412-14. The 1987 amendments
would also define residence as follows:
"'Residence' shall be defined by the tribal law or custom of the Indian child's
tribe, or in the absence of such law or custom, shall be defined as a place of general
abode or a principal, actual dwelling place of a continuing or lasting nature."
Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,534.
60. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). An exception to exclusive jurisdiction is provided where jurisdic-
tion is vested in the state under existing federal law. Id.
61. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). The 1987 amendments would expand the scope of this subsec-
tion by eliminating the restriction that the child custody proceeding involve a foster care place-
ment or termination of parental rights. Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,534.
62. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9). The ICWA defines parent as "any biological parent or parents of
an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including
adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include the unwed father where paternity
has not been acknowledged or established." Id. Additional language in the 1987 amendments
would further clarify the definition of parent:
Except for the purposes of sections 103(c) and (d), 104, 105(f), 106(a) and (b), 107,
301, the term parent shall not include any person whose parental rights have been
terminated. It includes the unwed father where paternity has been established under
tribal or state law, or recognized in accordance with tribal custom, or openly pro-
claimed to the court, the child's family, or a child placement or adoption agency.
For the purpose of section 102(a)[(involuntary child custody proceedings)], it also
includes an unwed father whose paternity has not been so established, recognized or
proclaimed.
Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,534.
63. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6). The ICWA defines Indian custodian as "any Indian person who
has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom
temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by the parent of such
child." Id.
64. Id. § 1903(5). The ICWA defines Indian child's tribe as:
(a) the Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a member or eligible for member-
ship or (b), in the case of an Indian child who is a member of or eligible for member-
ship in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has the
more significant contacts.
Id.
For a discussion of significant contacts, see Guidelines, supra note 30, at 67,586-87.
65. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). The 1987 amendments to the ICWA would limit the parent's
objection to an unrevoked one which is "determined to be consistent with the best interests of
the child as an Indian." Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,534. Furthermore, the amend-
ments would not allow a "parent whose rights have been terminated or who has consented to
an adoption" to object to the transfer. Id.
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cause to the contrary.66 Finally, the ICWA gives the Indian child's tribe and
the child's Indian custodian the right to intervene at any point in a state
court, child custody proceeding involving a foster care placement or termi-
nation of parental rights.67 Thus, Congress intended that tribes exercise re-
sponsibility for child welfare matters in as many cases as possible involving
Indian children.6"
The ICWA further provides that in any involuntary child custody pro-
ceeding involving a foster care placement of, or termination of parental
rights from, an Indian child, the party seeking such action must notify the
parents, or the Indian custodian, and the Indian child's tribe.69 The party
seeking the action must provide notice by registered mail with return receipt
requested.7 ° Significantly, the ICWA fails to make a similar provision for
voluntary proceedings.7"
66. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). The tribal court may decline, however, to accept the transfer.
Id. The Bureau of Indian Affairs provides state courts with some guidance as to what would
constitute "good cause to the contrary": 1) where there is no tribal court; 2) where the pro-
ceedings are at an advanced stage and the petition was not filed promptly after receiving no-
tice; 3) where an Indian child, over 12 years old, objects to the transfer; 4) where necessary
evidence cannot be adequately presented in the tribal court without undue hardship to parties
or witnesses; 5) where the parents of a five year old child, who has had little or no contact with
the tribe, are not available. Guidelines, supra note 30, at 67,590-92. The 1987 amendments
would limit denial of transfer by a state court to the situation where the proceedings are at an
advanced stage and the petition was not filed promptly after receiving notice. Amendments,
supra note 14, at S18,534; see also J.Q. v. D.R.L. (In re Adoption of T.R.M.), 525 N.E.2d 298,
307 (Ind. 1988) (discussing "good cause to the contrary").
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
68. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 57 U.S.L.W. 4409, 4414 n.24
(U.S. Apr. 3, 1989); 1978 Hearing, supra note 18, at 62 (statement of Chief Calvin Isaac, Nat'l
Tribal Chairmen's Ass'n); Guidelines, supra note 30, at 67,585-86; see also Amendments, supra
note 14, at S 18,539 ("The fundamental premise of the [ICWA] is that the interests of the child
will best be served by recognizing and strengthening the capacity of the tribe to be involved in
any legal matters dealing with the parent-child relationship.").
69. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). Where the identity or location of such parties cannot be deter-
mined, the ICWA provides that notice be given to the Secretary of the Interior, who shall have
15 days to notify such parties. Id.; cf 25 C.F.R. § 23.1 1(d)-(e) (1988) (providing that the
Bureau of Indian Affairs make a diligent effort to notify the parties within 10 days after receipt
of the notice).
70. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The ICWA further provides that such proceeding will not be
held until at least 10 days after receipt of notice on such parties, including the Secretary, if
applicable. Id. The 1987 amendments would increase this minimum period to 15 days where
notice is sent to the parent(s), the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe and 30 days
where notice is sent to the Secretary. Amendments, supra note 14, at S 18,534. Furthermore,
the ICWA provides that such parties, excluding the Secretary, shall be granted an additional
20 days to prepare, upon request to the state court. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The regulations
require the Bureau to inform the state court if it has been unsuccessful in notifying such parties
within 10 days after receipt of notice of the proceeding. At that point, the state court deter-
mines whether or not to proceed. 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(e) (1988).
71. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a). But see Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,535 (providing that
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In the case of voluntary proceedings, the ICWA establishes certain provi-
sions regarding consent to foster care placement, termination of parental
rights, and adoptive placement.72 First, consent to foster care placement or
termination of parental rights must be in writing and recorded before a judge
of a court of competent jurisdiction.73 Second, the judge must certify that
the consent was fully explained74 to the consenting individual and that such
individual fully understood the proceeding." Third, the ICWA provides
that consent to such proceedings will be invalid if "given prior to, or within
ten days after, birth of the Indian child."76 Fourth, consent may be with-
drawn at any time for a foster care placement 77 and at any time prior to a
final decree for termination of parental rights or for adoption.78
2. Preference for Placements
The ICWA sets forth placement preferences, to be followed in the absence
of good cause to the contrary, to guide state courts and agencies in placing
an Indian child in a foster care or adoptive home.79 In adoption placements,
the ICWA directs that a preference be given in the following order: to the
child's extended family, other members of the Indian child's tribe, and other
Indian families.$' Similarly, a preference in foster care or preadoptive place-
ments is to be given first to the child's extended family, second to a foster
home approved by the Indian child's tribe, third to an Indian foster home,
and finally, to an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or
operated by an Indian organization."1
The preferences in the ICWA are not absolute. The Indian child's tribe
may adopt a resolution changing the order of preferences.8 2 State courts and
notice of a voluntary child custody proceeding be given to the Indian child's tribe and the non-
consenting parent, if any, at least 10 days prior to the proceeding).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a).
73. Id. See generally Guidelines, supra note 30, at 67,593-94 (guidelines for execution and
content of consent).
74. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a). The ICWA requires the explanation to be in a language other
than English where necessary. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b). See generally Guidelines, supra note 30, at 67,594.
78. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c). After an entry of a final decree, consent may be withdrawn only
within two years (unless provided otherwise under state law) if such consent was obtained
through fraud or duress. Id. § 1913(d).
79. Id. § 1915.
80. Id. § 1915(a).
81. Id. § 1915(b). The state court should place the Indian child in the "least restrictive
setting which most approximates a family and in which his special needs, if any, may be met."
Id.
82. Id. § 1915(c).
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agencies must follow such resolutions in the placement of Indian children.83
Further, the ICWA allows state courts and agencies to consider the prefer-
ence of the Indian child or parent when determining placement of the Indian
child.84 The ICWA also permits placement with a non-Indian family where
placement in one of the stated preferences cannot be found.8,
II. BREAKUP OF AN "EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY"
A. Illegitimate Indian Children of a Non-Indian Mother: Not Part of an
"Existing Indian Family"
Shortly after Congress enacted the ICWA, the courts began to determine
the extent of the ICWA's provisions. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in In re
Adoption of Baby Boy L.,86 became one of the first courts to hold that the
ICWA did not apply to adoption proceedings involving an illegitimate In-
dian child given up by his non-Indian mother.87 Baby Boy L. was the illegit-
imate son of Miss L., a non-Indian mother, and Perciado, a five-eighths
Kiowa Indian father.8 8 On the day of Baby Boy L.'s birth, his mother exe-
cuted a consent to adoption. 9 The adoptive parents filed their petitions for
adoption on the same day and the court granted them temporary custody of
Baby Boy L.9 ° Notice of the adoption proceeding was personally served on
Perciado at the Kansas State Industrial Reformatory.9" Perciado answered
the amended petition asking that he be found a fit parent, that his parental
rights not be severed, and that he be given permanent custody of Baby Boy
L. 
92
83. Id.
84. Id. The ICWA further provides that the state court give weight to a consenting par-
ent's desire for anonymity when placing the Indian child. Id.; see also Guidelines, supra note
30, at 67,594-95. But see Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,536 (stating that the parent's
desire for confidentiality will be considered as long as placement is made with one of the
preferences in § 1915(a) or (b) (corresponding with § 105(b) and (c) of the Amendments) and
will not be grounds for withholding notice from the Indian child's tribe).
85. H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7546.
86. 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168 (1982). The 1987 Amendments would allow federal
courts to review the final decree of a state court alleged to be in violation of the ICWA.
Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,535.
87. 231 Kan. at 207, 643 P.2d at 176.
88. Id. at 201, 643 P.2d at 172.
89. Id. Miss L. specifically directed and limited the consent to the adoptive parents
named therein. Id.
90. Id. Subsequently, the adoptive parents amended their petition alleging Perciado
would be an unfit parent and requesting that his parental rights be terminated. Id. at 202, 643
P.2d at 173.
91. Id. at 202, 643 P.2d at 172.
92. Id. at 202, 643 P.2d at 173.
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At trial, the court found that because Perciado was an enrolled member of
the Kiowa Tribe, the ICWA might apply.93 The lower court continued the
trial for thirty days to allow notice to be provided to the Kiowa Tribe. 94 The
Kiowa Tribe filed a petition to intervene, followed by petitions to change
temporary custody and to transfer jurisdiction.95 During this time, the Ki-
owa Tribe enrolled Baby Boy L. as a member of the tribe against the express
wishes of his non-Indian mother.96
The trial court found that the ICWA did not apply,97 denied the Kiowa
Tribe's petition to intervene, and held that the tribe's other petitions were
moot.98 The court further found that Perciado would be an unfit parent99
and granted the adoption of Baby Boy L. to the adoptive parents. i°
The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
the ICWA did not apply to these proceedings. 101 To support its conclusion,
the court looked to the legislative history and the language of the ICWA. 102
The Kansas court found that Congress intended to maintain existing family
and tribal relationships. 10 3 Furthermore, it concluded that Congress did not
intend to "dictate that an illegitimate infant who has never been a member of
an Indian home or culture, and probably never would be, should be removed
from its primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian environment over
the express objections of its non-Indian mother.""
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 203, 643 P.2d at 173.
96. Id.
97. Id. The trial court concluded that the ICWA did not apply because of the following
factors: 1) the illegitimate child of a non-Indian mother was involved; 2) the non-Indian
mother voluntarily consented to the adoption on the day of the child's birth and released the
child to the adoptive parents; 3) the child was never in the care of the putative Indian father; 4)
preservation of the Indian family was not an issue since the child was never a part of any
Indian family relationship; 5) the Kiowa Tribe enrolled the child as a member of the Tribe
after initiation of these proceedings and over the expressed objection of the non-Indian mother;
6) neither a state nor federal agency was unilaterally removing an Indian child from his family;
and 7) absent the mother's consent, it appeared the child would never be part of an Indian
family. Id. at 204-05, 643 P.2d at 174-75.
98. Id. at 203, 643 P.2d at 173.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 203, 643 P.2d at 174.
101. Id. at 207, 643 P.2d at 176. In addition, the Kansas Supreme Court argued in the
alternative that even if the ICWA applied, the adoption would still have been granted, and
therefore, the trial court's ruling would have-been harmless error at best. Id. at 208-11, 643
P.2d at 176-78.
102. Id. at 205-06, 643 P.2d at 175 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4), 191 l(a), 1912(d)-(f), 1914,
1916(b), 1920, 1922).
103. Id. at 205, 643 P.2d at 175.
104. Id. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175.
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The Kansas court also cited several provisions of the ICWA to support its
conclusion that an Indian family must exist prior to the operation of the
ICWA. 10 5 First, the court cited section 1901(4),"° which expresses Con-
gress' finding that Indian families are broken up by public and private agen-
cies. Section 1901(4) supported the court's conclusion because an Indian
family could not be broken up until it existed. The court next cited section
1911(a), °7 which provides exclusive jurisdiction to the Indian tribe over
"any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation." Section 1911(a) also supported the
court's conclusion because this section implied that a relationship with the
tribe existed. The court then cited section 1912(d), °8 which provides that
efforts must be made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Again, the
reference to a breakup of an Indian family in this section implies that an
Indian family must exist. Sections 1912(e) and (f),o 9 which refer to the
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian, also sup-
ported the court's conclusion. The language "continued custody" suggests
that a physical relationship exists between an Indian parent and an Indian
child. Next, the court cited section 1914,"1 which refers to the removal of
the child from the parent or Indian custodian. Finally, the court cited sec-
tions 1916(b),1" 1920,12 and 1922,"3 which also reflect concern for the
removal of an Indian child from an existing Indian family. The court found
105. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4), 191 1(a), 1912(d)-(f), 1914, 1916(b), 1920, 1922).
106. Id. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; see 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1982); see also supra note 43 (text
of § 1901(4)).
107. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a);
see also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussion of § 191 l(a)).
108. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d);
see also infra note 212 (text of § 1912(d)).
109. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)-
(f); see also infra note 212 (text of § 1912(e)-(f)).
110. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; see 25 U.S.C. § 1914. This
section states, in pertinent part, that "any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such
child was removed ... may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such
action." Id. (emphasis added).
111. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; see 25 U.S.C. § 1916(b).
This section provides that "[w]henever an Indian child is removed from a foster care home or
institution for the purpose of further foster care, preadoptive, or adoptive placement, such
placement shall be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." Id. (emphasis added).
112. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; see 25 U.S.C. § 1920. This
section provides that "[w]here any petitioner in an Indian child custody proceeding before a
State court has improperly removed the child from custody of the parent or Indian custodian
... the court shall decline jurisdiction over such petition." Id. (emphasis added).
113. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; see 25 U.S.C. § 1922. This
section provides that "an Indian child who is a resident of or is domiciled on a reservation, but
temporarily located off the reservation [may be removed in an emergency situation] in order to
prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child." Id.
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that each of these sections referred to an "existing Indian family."' 4 There-
fore, the court reasoned that the ICWA only applied where the removal of
an Indian child from an existing Indian family resulted in a breakup of the
Indian family.' "
The Arizona Court of Appeals, in In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 1
16
took up the issue the following year. In Appeal in Maricopa County, R.M., a
non-Indian, gave birth to a baby girl who was placed in a foster home to be
adopted." 7 The putative father was Edmund Jackson, a Pima Indian."1
8
After being informed about the baby, Jackson neither acknowledged nor at-
tempted to establish his paternity." 9 The lower court granted the agency's
petition to terminate Jackson's parental rights.' 2° Finding that Jackson
knew of the baby, but had failed to establish paternity, the trial court con-
cluded that he had abandoned the child. 121 More than a year later, the tribe
moved to intervene in both the adoption and termination of parental rights
proceedings. 122 Several months later, Jackson signed and filed an affidavit
acknowledging paternity. 123 Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted the
final order of adoption, concluding that despite the ICWA's placement pref-
erence, the "'best interests' of the child required her continued placement
with the adoptive parent."'
124
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals found
that before the ICWA applies two prerequisites must be met: one, a child
114. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175. To support its rationale
further, the Kansas court cited a law review article, see Barsh, supra note 3, at 1305, which
stated that the ICWA "principally applies to cases where a state court attempts to remove an
Indian child from his or her home on grounds of the alleged incompetence or brutality of the
parents." Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206-07, 643 P.2d at 176.
115. Adoption of Baby Boy L, 231 Kan. at 207, 643 P.2d at 176. Rejecting a collateral
attack, The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the state court
determination that the ICWA did not apply binds federal courts. Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis, 777
F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986). But see In re Adoption of a Child
of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925 (1988) (rejecting the existing Indian family
theory); Amendments, supra note 14, at S 18,533 (that a child custody proceeding includes any
proceeding "involving an Indian child regardless of whether [he] has previously lived in Indian
Country, in an Indian cultural environment or with an Indian parent"); infra notes 169-237
and accompanying text (discussion of the flawed reasoning behind the existing Indian family
theory); infra text accompanying notes 244-45 (discussion of the effect of this amendment).
116. 136 Ariz. 528, 667 P.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1983).
117. Id. at 530, 667 P.2d at 230.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 531, 667 P.2d at 231.
124. Id.
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custody proceeding, as defined under section 1903(1); and two, an Indian
child, as defined under section 1903(4).125 The Arizona court found that
Jackson consistently declined to acknowledge the child until three years af-
ter the child was born, and further, that Jackson could not have been consid-
ered a parent 26 until he had done so.' 27 The court reasoned that Congress,
by the definition of parent, did not intend to extend the ICWA to an illegiti-
mate child whose mother is non-Indian and whose putative Indian father has
not even acknowledged the child. 2 ' The Arizona court concluded that this
construction was in agreement with the stated purpose of the ICWA in that
the child cannot be considered an Indian child until the Indian father ac-
knowledges it.' 29 Therefore, the court reasoned, no breakup of an existing
Indian family could occur. 130 Consequently, the Arizona court limited the
application of the existing Indian family theory to those instances where a
child is born out of wedlock to a non-Indian mother and the putative Indian
father fails to acknowledge or establish paternity.' 3 '
Within two years of the Arizona Court of Appeals decision, the issue of
the ICWA's applicability to an adoption of an illegitimate Indian child vol-
untarily relinquished at birth by his non-Indian mother came before the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D. 132 As in Appeal
in Maricopa County, the unwed, non-Indian mother of Baby Boy D. gave
him up for adoption shortly after birth. 133 The putative father knew of the
baby but showed no interest in him or his mother until after the lower court
ordered a decree of adoption.' 34 The lower court found that the father
lacked standing to request that the decree of adoption be vacated, that the
ICWA did not apply, and that the father had failed to establish a relation-
ship with the child that could be constitutionally protected.' 35
A majority of the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the "central
125. Id.; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text (other courts identifying these
prerequisites).
126. Appeal in Maricopa County, 136 Ariz. at 532, 667 P.2d at 232; see 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(9); see also supra note 62 (definition of parent does not include an unwed father where
paternity has neither been acknowledged nor established).
127. Appeal in Maricopa County, 136 Ariz. at 532, 667 P.2d at 232.
128. Id. at 533, 667 P.2d at 233.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 532, 667 P.2d at 232.
132. 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1042 (1988).
133. Id. at 1061.
134. Id. at 1064. The putative father had neither received notice of, nor consented to, the
adoption. Id. at 1061.
135. Id. at 1060. For the Oklahoma court's discussion of the constitutionally protected
rights of the unwed father, see id. at 1064-69.
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thrust and concern of the ICWA [was] 'the establishment of minimum fed-
eral standards for the removal of Indian children from their families.' ,,136
Like the Kansas Supreme Court,13 7 the Oklahoma court cited several provi-
sions of the ICWA, including sections 1901(4), 1911(a) and 1912(d)-(f) to
support its findings. 138 From the statutory language, the court concluded
that the ICWA only applies to the removal of Indian children from an ex-
isting Indian environment.1 39 In addition, the Oklahoma court found that
the putative father was not a parent as defined by the ICWA, 14 and, more
importantly, that the child, never having been in the father's custody, was
not removed from his custody. 141 Consequently, the father lacked standing
to invalidate the adoption under section 1914 of the ICWA.' 4 2
Stating that it was grounded in flawed premises, Justice Kauger dissented
from the majority opinion. 4 3 First, Justice Kauger disagreed with the ma-
jority opinion that the provisions of the ICWA did not apply to unwed fa-
thers. 1" Relying on section 1903(9), Justice Kauger reasoned that unwed
fathers are excluded only if the father fails to acknowledge or establish pater-
nity. 4 In this case, Justice Kauger noted that the father had attempted to
acknowledge paternity.146 Therefore, Justice Kauger concluded that the fa-
ther had standing to challenge the adoption proceeding under the ICWA. 147
Second, Justice Kauger disagreed with the majority's premise that the
ICWA does not apply to children who are not domiciled in Indian homes. 141
To support her position, Justice Kauger looked to the legislative history and
the language of the ICWA.' 4 9 She found that the legislative history, particu-
larly the hearings, identified several factors that Congress relied upon in en-
136. Id. at 1063.
137. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168 (1982); see also supra
notes 101-15 and accompanying text (discussion of Kansas Supreme Court holding).
138. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1063.
139. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 176-228 (rebutting the existing Indian fam-
ily theory).
140. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1064; see 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1982); see also
supra note 62 (definition of parent).
141. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1064.
142. Id. The 1987 amendments to the ICWA would remove the restriction of custody by
the parent, and thereby provide a non-custodial parent standing to challenge a state court
action for violation of the ICWA. Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,535; see also infra text
accompanying notes 255-58 (discussion of amendment).
143. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1073 (Kauger, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1075.
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acting the ICWA.' 5 ° First, Indian culture differs from Anglo-Saxon
culture.1 51 Second, a significantly higher rate of Indian children, especially
those under one year of age, were separated from their Indian families com-
pared to non-Indian children.152 Third, the separation of Indian children
from their Indian culture robbed them of their cultural heritage and often
was detrimental to their later development. 153 Each of these factors applied
equally to the adoption of illegitimate Indian children by non-Indian fami-
lies. Therefore, Justice Kauger concluded that Congress intended the ICWA
to apply to all Indian children.' 54
B. Illegitimate Indian Children of an Indian Mother: Not Part of an
"Existing Indian Family"
In re Adoption of TR.M. 155 is factually similar to the cases discussed
above, with one significant exception: the unwed mother relinquishing her
child was Indian. J.Q., an Indian woman, voluntarily gave up her seven day
old son, T.R.M., to non-Indian friends who agreed to adopt him. 156 Shortly
thereafter, J.Q. consented in writing to the adoption."5 7 Approximately one
year later, J.Q. filed a habeas corpus action in the state circuit court and the
tribe filed a similar action claiming jurisdiction.1"8 The circuit court dis-
missed the tribe's action and denied J.Q.'s petition. 159 One day prior to the
filing of the adoption petition by the adoptive parents, the Indian tribal court
entered an order of wardship of the child. 1"° The circuit court granted the
adoption the following year. 16 ' The court of appeals reversed the circuit
court order on grounds that, pursuant to section 1911 (a) of the ICWA, the
150. Id. See generally 1978 Hearing, supra note 18; 1977 Hearing, supra note 2; 1974
Hearing, supra note 2.
151. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1075 (Kauger, J., dissenting); see supra note 32
and accompanying text.
152. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1075 (Kauger, J., dissenting); see supra notes 19-
25 and accompanying text.
153. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1075 (Kauger, J., dissenting); see supra notes 26-
29 and accompanying text.
154. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1077 (Kauger, J., dissenting). Justice Kauger
also pointed out that no distinction is made in the ICWA based on reservation status or envi-
ronmental circumstances. Id.; cf supra note 49 (1987 amendments providing that no such
distinction be made); infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text (further discussion of
amendment).
155. 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988).
156. Id. at 302.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Indian tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.' 62
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, stating that
where the purpose and intent of Congress could not be achieved, the ICWA
should not be applied. 163 The Indiana court looked to the reasoning of the
Oklahoma court in Adoption of Baby Boy D., 4 and accepted the existing
Indian family requirement imposed by that court. 165 The Indiana court
found no breakup of the Indian family because the Indian mother had aban-
doned the child 66 at the earliest possible moment after childbirth. 167 There-
fore, the court concluded that the ICWA did not apply to this case.' 6 ' This
decision expanded the theory of an existing Indian family to a fact situation
involving an Indian mother.
C. Rejecting the Existing Indian Family Theory
In In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage,169 an unwed Indian
mother voluntarily gave up her child, Baby Larry, for adoption seven days
after the child's birth. 170 Nearly two years later, the putative Indian father
filed a motion to vacate the adoption order.17' The trial court denied the
motion without prejudice. 172  On the father's renewed petition, the trial
court found that the child was not an Indian child' 73 under the ICWA and
that the father had failed to acknowledge paternity at the time of the adop-
tion proceedings. 174 Therefore, the trial court held that the ICWA did not
162. Id.
163. Id. at 303.
164. Id. at 302; see In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985); see also
supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text (discussion of the Oklahoma court holding).
165. Adoption of TR.M., 525 N.E.2d at 303.
166. Id. But see Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,535 (consent to adoptive placement
shall not be deemed abandonment of the child by the parent).
167. Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d at 303.
168. Id. In the rest of the opinion, the Indiana Supreme Court decided the case as if the
ICWA did apply as a separate and independent basis for its decision, and concluded that the
adoption should stand. Id.
169. 111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925 (1988).
170. Id. at 162, 543 A.2d at 928. Neither the Indian mother nor the Indian father lived on
the Rosebud Sioux reservation, but resided in towns bordering the reservation. Id. at 161, 543
A.2d at 928.
171. Id. at 164, 543 A.2d at 929. The motion to vacate was filed one day before the one-
year period to overturn a judgment on the basis of fraud would have expired under New Jersey
law. Id.
172. Id. at 165, 543 A.2d at 929.
173. Id. at 165, 543 A.2d at 930. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe noted that Baby Larry did "not
meet the one-quarter blood quotient requirement" for enrollment since his mother only had 9/
32 Rosebud Sioux blood. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1982); see also supra note 56 and ac-
companying text (defining Indian child).
174. Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. at 165, 543 A.2d at 930.
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
apply. 175
The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with the interpretation that the
ICWA does not apply where an unwed mother voluntarily relinquishes her
child for adoption shortly after birth. 176 The court declared that such an
interpretation "posits as a determinative jurisdictional test the voluntariness
of the conduct of the mother."1 77 The New Jersey court noted that although
"voluntariness" is important in the application of the ICWA, lack of "volun-
tariness" is not a prerequisite for the ICWA to apply.' 78 The New Jersey
court found further support for its holding in the definition of child custody
proceeding, which includes "any action resulting in the termination of the
parent-child relationship."' 79  Furthermore, the New Jersey court main-
tained that, where the unwed father has not consented to the adoption, "the
application of the ICWA to voluntary private placement adoptions is not
inconsistent with the purposes of the [ICWA]."' 8 ° In such cases, there may
be an involuntary termination of the father's parental rights which should be
given the protections provided by section 1912 of the ICWA."'8 The New
Jersey court also noted that the effects of the separation, loss of cultural
heritage and higher potential for psychological harm remain the same re-
gardless of whether the placement was voluntary or involuntary. 8 2 Fur-
thermore, the court noted that the economic factors that concerned
Congress with respect to induced voluntary relinquishments to state agencies
are also implicated in private placements.'" 3 Finally, the New Jersey court
asserted that consideration be given to the rights of the Indian child's father
and Congress' belief that maintaining a relationship with the Indian tribe is
in the best interest of the Indian child. 184 For these reasons, the New Jersey
court held that the ICWA did apply in this case.' 85
175. Id.
176. Id. at 169, 543 A.2d at 932.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 169-70, 543 A.2d at 932.
179. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii)); see supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (dis-
cussion of child custody proceedings).
180. Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. at 170, 543 A.2d at 932; see supra
notes 71-78 and accompanying text (discussion of § 1913 dealing with voluntary consent).
181. Adoption ofa Child ofIndian Heritage, 111 N.J. at 170, 543 A.2d at 932.
182. Id.
183. Id. The New Jersey Court cites Barsh, supra note 3, at 1299, in support of this con-
tention. See also H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7533.
184. Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 11l N.J. at 170, 543 A.2d at 932; see also
supra note 68 and accompanying text.
185. Adoption ofa Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. at 170-71, 543 A.2d at 932.
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III. THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY THEORY: A NARROW
CONSTRUCTION OF THE ICWA
A. The Legislative History of the ICWA: More than One Purpose
The legislative history of the ICWA supports the view of the New Jersey
court in Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage 186 and the dissenting opinion
of Justice Kauger in Adoption of Baby Boy D. 187 that the ICWA applies to
illegitimate Indian children voluntarily relinquished for adoption shortly af-
ter birth to a non-Indian family. First, Congress recognized that adoptions
of Indian children by non-Indian families constituted part of the Indian
child welfare crisis.' 88 Second, Congress determined that consent to adop-
tion often was coerced 8 9 or obtained from parents uninformed as to the
legal effect of the consent to their relinquishment of their parental rights.' 9 °
The report accompanying the ICWA further suggested that private individu-
als, as well as state agencies, may have an economic incentive in obtaining a
voluntary consent of adoption for an Indian child.191 Moreover, as the New
Jersey court pointed out, the effects of separation 92 of the Indian child from
his Indian family, and usually from his Indian culture,'93 are the same re-
gardless of whether the separation was voluntary or involuntary. 94 Clearly,
the concern of Congress in enacting the ICWA, as illustrated by the legisla-
tive history, includes the adoption of illegitimate Indian children.
The Kansas,' 95 Oklahoma 196 and Indiana' 97 courts interpreted the pur-
pose of the ICWA, "to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the re-
186. Id. at 155, 543 A.2d at 925; see supra notes 169-85 and accompanying text (discussion
of case).
187. 742 P.2d 1059, 1073 (Okla. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1042 (1988); see supra notes
143-54 and accompanying text (discussion of Justice Kauger's dissent).
188. See supra notes 3, 19-26 and accompanying text (discussion of the high rate of adop-
tions of Indian children).
189. H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7533.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
194. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 11 N.J. 155, 170, 543 A.2d 925, 932
(1988); see supra text accompanying note 182; see also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 57 U.S.L.W. 4409, 4414 n.25 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1989).
195. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168 (1982); see supra notes
86-115 and accompanying text (discussion of case).
196. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1042 (1988); see supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text (discussion of case).
197. J.Q. v. D.R.L. (In re Adoption of T.R.M.), 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988); see supra
notes 155-68 and accompanying text (discussion of case).
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moval of Indian children from their families", 198 as implying that the over-
riding concern of Congress was to maintain existing Indian families.'99
With this interpretation, these courts excluded illegitimate Indian children
from the definition of the existing Indian family.2" In light of the legislative
history of the ICWA, 2° ' the existing Indian family theory2 2 is thus contrary
to the intent of Congress.
B. The Language of the ICWA. The Other Provisions
The Kansas, Oklahoma, and Indiana courts base their conclusions that
the ICWA fails to apply to adoptions of illegitimate children primarily upon
sections 1901(4), 1911(a), 1912(d)-(f) and 1914 of the ICWA. 20 3 Granted,
each of these sections do imply that an Indian family must exist before the
ICWA applies.2°4 These courts, however, fail to acknowledge that these sec-
tions only deal with a part of the problem Congress addressed by enacting
the ICWA.
First, the Kansas, Oklahoma, and Indiana courts rely upon section
1901(4), which states "that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families
are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from
them .... ,2o5 These courts infer from this language that the ICWA applies
only to a preexisting Indian family.20 6 This reading ignores the fact that
"the removal" of children referred to in this same finding includes the high
rate of voluntary placement of newborns within their first year of life.2 °7
Therefore, section 1901(4) fails to support the existing Indian family theory.
The Kansas, Oklahoma, and Indiana courts also cite section 1911(a),
which provides exclusive jurisdiction to tribal courts for child custody pro-
ceedings involving Indian children residing or domiciled on the reserva-
198. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 18, at 8, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7530 (emphasis added).
199. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 205-06, 643 P.2d at 175; Adoption of Baby Boy
D., 742 P.2d at 1063; Adoption of TR.M, 525 N.E. 2d at 303.
200. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; Adoption of Baby Boy D.,
742 P.2d at 1063; Adoption of T.R.M, 525 N.E.2d at 303.
201. See supra notes 18-47, 186-94 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history).
202. See supra notes 86-142, 155-68 and accompanying text (discussing cases developing
existing Indian family theory).
203. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; Adoption of Baby Boy D.,
742 P.2d at 1063; Adoption of T.R.M, 525 N.E.2d at 303.
204. See infra notes 205, 208, 212, 218 and accompanying text.
205. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1982) (emphasis added).
206. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; Adoption of Baby Boy D.,
742 P.2d at 1063; Adoption of TR.M, 525 N.E. 2d at 303.
207. See supra notes 3, 19-25 and accompanying text (discussion of higher placement rate
of Indian children).
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tion.2° This section implies an existing Indian tribal relationship with the
Indian child. Similar to section 1911 (a), section 1911 (b) provides concurrent
jurisdiction to tribal courts for child custody proceedings involving Indian
children not residing or domiciled on a reservation.20 9 Section 1911 (b) thus
allows jurisdiction in the tribal court without requiring an existing Indian
relationship. The only requirements for section 1911(b) to operate are a
child custody proceeding, involving an Indian child, and a petition to trans-
fer by either parent, the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe.210 Fur-
thermore, the lack of a requirement for parental custody in section 1911 (b)
implies that the ICWA does not require an existing Indian family. Nor does
this section require that the Indian child be a ward of the Indian Tribe. By
requiring an "existing Indian family," the Kansas, Oklahoma and Indiana
courts render this section ineffective by disallowing a non-custodial parent or
the Indian child's tribe to petition to transfer the child custody proceeding to
the tribal court.
The Kansas, Oklahoma, and Indiana courts also cite sections 1912(d)-
(f).2"' While these sections imply that the existence of an Indian family is
required before the ICWA applies,2" 2 the courts' reliance on them is mis-
placed. These sections deal specifically with involuntary proceedings. Those
seeking the involuntary separation of the parent and child must prove that
certain requirements are met before the involuntary separation occurs.2 13
208. See Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; Adoption of Baby Boy
D., 742 P.2d at 1063; Adoption of TR.M., 525 N.E.2d at 303; 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(a); see also
supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing § 191 l(a)).
209. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b); see supra notes 61, 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 1911 (b)).
210. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b); see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
211. Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. at 206, 643 P.2d at 175; Adoption of Baby Boy D.,
742 P.2d at 1063; Adoption of TR.M., 525 N.E.2d at 303.
212. Section 1912(d): "Any party seeking ... foster care ... or termination of parental
rights... shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services
and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family .... . 25
U.S.C. § 1912(d) (emphasis added).
Section 1912(e): "No foster care placement may be ordered ... in the absence of a determi-
nation, supported by clear and convincing evidence.... that the continued custody of the child
by the parent.., is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." Id.
§ 1912(e) (emphasis added). This section establishes the burden of proof in a foster care place-
ment proceeding.
Section 1912(f): "No termination of parental rights may be ordered ... in the absence of a
determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt .... that the continued cus-
tody of the child by the parent.., is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
the child." Id. § 1912(f) (emphasis added). This section establishes the burden of proof in a
proceeding involving the termination of parental rights.
213. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)-(f); see supra note 212 (text of § 1912 (d)-(f)).
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These sections do not require an existing Indian family before the ICWA
applies.
Congress expressed its concerns regarding voluntary consent 214 to adop-
tion at birth or shortly thereafter in section 1913 of the ICWA.215 In partic-
ular, the last sentence of section 1913(a) declares that "[any consent given
prior to, or within ten days after, birth of the Indian child shall not be
valid.",21 6 This language contains no indication that Congress intended the
provisions of the ICWA to apply only to those adoptions involving the re-
moval of Indian children from an "existing Indian family." In fact, by inval-
idating consent prior to or shortly after birth, this language demands a
contrary interpretation. By failing to consider this language, the Kansas,
Oklahoma, and Indiana courts once again fail to recognize a section of the
ICWA that is contrary to the existing Indian family theory.
In addition, the Kansas and Oklahoma courts cite section 1914 as further
support for the existing Indian family theory.217 Section 1914 provides that
a parent or Indian custodian from whose custody the child has been re-
moved has standing to challenge the validity of a state action where the
ICWA is applicable.21 This section does not specify the period of time that
custody is required before it confers standing on the parent or Indian custo-
dian. Nonetheless, the Indiana court found that no Indian family existed
even though the Indian child lived with the Indian mother for five days prior
to being given up for adoption.2 9 The ICWA also provides that this same
right to challenge the validity of a state action be conferred to the Indian
child's tribe.220 Again, the right is not conditioned on an "existing relation-
ship" between the child and the tribe.
214. In all of the above cases, the mother voluntarily consented to the adoption. However,
the adoptions are all contested by the Indian father who did not consent, except for the case of
In re Adoption of T.R.M. in which the Indian mother contested the adoption. 525 N.E.2d at
302.
215. 25 U.S.C. § 1913. Section 1913(a) states:
Where any parent ... voluntarily consents to a foster care placement or to termi-
nation of parental rights, such consent shall not be valid unless executed in writing
and recorded before a judge ... and accompanied by ... judge's certificate that the
terms and consequences of the consent were fully explained in detail and were fully
understood by the parent... Any consent given prior to, or within ten days after, birth
of the Indian child shall not be valid.
Id. § 1913(a) (emphasis added); see supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 1913(a)).
216. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a)(emphasis added).
217. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 206, 643 P.2d 168, 175 (1982); In re
Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985).
218. 25 U.S.C. § 1914.
219. J.Q. v. D.R.L. (In re Adoption of T.R.M.), 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (1988).
220. 25 U.S.C. § 1914.
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Finally, the Kansas, Oklahoma, and Indiana courts fail to cite section
1903(1). This section defines child custody proceedings to include voluntary
proceedings by using the language "any action, '  in lieu of the language
"any involuntary action," in the definition of termination of parental
rights222 and of adoptive placement.223 Therefore, section 1903(1) supports
the New Jersey approach that the ICWA applies to voluntary adoption pro-
ceedings of illegitimate Indian children.
Equally important is Congress' concern that an Indian child maintain a
relationship with his Indian tribe.224 The declared purpose of the ICWA
expresses such concern by the use of the language, "placement ... which
will reflect the unique values of Indian culture." '225 The maintenance of an
Indian child-tribal relationship becomes more evident when the provisions
for placement preferences are considered.226 Section 1915(a) provides place-
ment preferences specifically for adoption proceedings.227 Further support
for maintaining a tribal relationship can be found in various other provisions
that give Indian tribes rights in child custody proceedings.
228
C. Proper Construction of the ICWA: Including Illegitimate Children
Justice Kauger and the New Jersey Supreme Court properly followed the
general rules of construction for federal statutes dealing with Indians.229
The Bureau of Indian Affairs' Guidelines to State Courts stated that the
ICWA be liberally construed in a manner consistent with Congress' prefer-
ences to keep Indian families together, to defer to tribal judgment on Indian
child custody matters and to place Indian children with their extended fam-
221. Id. § 1903(1).
222. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii); see also supra note 51 (defining termination of parental
rights).
223. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iv); see also supra note 53 (defining adoptive placement).
224. 25 U.S.C. § 1902; see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing § 1902);
see also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 57 U.S.L.W. 4409, 4414 n. 24 (U.S.
Apr. 3, 1989).
225. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
226. Id. § 1915.
227. Id. § 1915(a); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing placement
preferences of adoptions).
228. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (requiring transfer of jurisdiction from state court to
tribal court upon petition of Indian child's tribe); id. § 1912 (requiring notice of involuntary
proceeding be given to Indian child's tribe); id. § 1914 (allowing Indian child's tribe to petition
court to invalidate the child custody proceeding); id. § 1915 (allowing Indian child's tribe to
establish different order of preferences for placement); id. § 1919 (allowing Indian tribes to
enter with states into agreements regarding child custody proceedings).
229. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1071 (1985) (Kauger, J., dissenting);
see also In re Adoption of K.L.R.F., 356 Pa. Super. 555, 562, 515 A.2d 33, 37 (1986), appeal
dismissed, 516 Pa. 520, 533 A.2d 708 (1987).
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ily or Indian tribe when it is necessary to remove them from their
homes."2 a The Guidelines further stated that the courts should resolve any
ambiguities in the ICWA consistent with the placement preferences. 231
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of construction
of treaties and statutes dealing with Indians. In Choctaw Nation v. United
States, 2 32 the Court determined that treaties with the Indians should be lib-
erally construed as the Indians would have understood them.233 More re-
cently, the Court stated that doubts concerning the meaning of a treaty with
Indian tribes should be resolved in favor of Indians.234 Furthermore, the
Court applied these same canons of construction to legislation passed for the
benefit of Indians.235 The Court reasoned that treaties and legislation deal-
ing with Indians must be considered in light of "the broad policies that un-
derlie them" and the traditional notions of tribal sovereignty.236 Congress
enacted the ICWA as remedial legislation to strengthen the Indian family
and tribe.237 As a result, the statute should be construed so as to fulfill those
purposes. The Supreme Court precedent required state courts to follow
these canons of construction when construing the ICWA. Therefore, the
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Indiana courts clearly failed to construe the ICWA
properly.
IV. THE 1987 AMENDMENTS: CLARIFYING THE INTENT OF CONGRESS
Since the enactment of the ICWA, amendments have been introduced.238
In introducing the 1987 amendments to the ICWA,239 Senator Evans stated
that those who believed the ICWA emphasized the interest of the Indian
tribe over the Indian child resisted implementation of the ICWA. 4° Senator
Evans further acknowledged that ambiguities inherent within the ICWA
contributed to the many judicial disputes over jurisdiction. 241 As a result,
among their several stated purposes, the 1987 amendments attempt to clarify
230. Guidelines, supra note 30, at 67,585-86.
231. Id.
232. 318 U.S. 423 (1943).
233. Id. at 431-32.
234. Oregon Dep't of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 766 (1985).
235. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982).
236. Id.; see also Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918) (stating
that "statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes... are to be liberally construed,
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians").
237. In re Adoption of K.L.R.F., 356 Pa. Super. 555, 557, 515 A.2d 33, 34, (1986), appeal
dismissed, 516 Pa. 520, 533 A.2d 708 (1987).
238. Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,532.
239. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
240. Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,532 (statement of Sen. Evans).
241. Id.
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the original intent of Congress in enacting the ICWA.2 42
Several provisions would clarify the applicability of the ICWA,243 particu-
larly on the issue of whether the ICWA applies to adoptions of illegitimate
Indian children. Section 4(l),244 which defines a child custody proceeding,
is directly on point. This section would expressly provide that the ICWA
applies to any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child "regard-
less of whether the child has previously lived in Indian Country, in an Indian
cultural environment or with an Indian parent., 245 Thus, this section di-
rectly opposes the existing Indian family theory. As a consequence, it would
require courts following that theory to abandon it.
Similarly, section 4(1)(iv) 246 clarifies the extent of the operation of the
ICWA with respect to private placements by providing that the term "adop-
tive placement" includes placements made by private agencies and individu-
als as well as state agencies. 247 Even though the congressional hearings248
indicated abuses by private agencies and individuals, some courts have con-
cluded that Congress intended to apply the ICWA only to state agencies.249
This section would rectify that misconception.
242. Id. at S18,538. Senator Inouye expressed his belief that the amendments are "neces-
sary to achieve the original intent of the Congress when it adopted the [ICWA] in 1978." Id.
at S18,539.
243. Other provisions of the 1987 amendments merit consideration, but such consideration
is beyond the scope of this Comment. Such sections include: 4(2)-defining domicile, Amend-
ments, supra note 14, at S18,533; 4(10)-expanding the rights of an unwed father who has not
established nor acknowledged paternity in involuntary proceedings, id. at S18,534; 4(13)-defin-
ing residence, id.; 101(b)-limiting an objection to transfer only if consistent with the best inter-
est of the child as an Indian, id.; 101(b)-limiting the scope of "good cause to the contrary," id;
101(b)-stating that "parent whose rights have been terminated or who has consented to an
adoption may not object to transfer," id.; 103(a)(2)-providing notice to the Indian child's tribe
and the non-consenting parent in voluntary proceedings, id. at S18,535; 103(a)(3)-providing
that consent to a child custody proceeding fails to establish abandonment of the child, id.;
104(b)-giving federal courts jurisdiction to review final decrees of state courts alleged to be in
violation of the ICWA, id.; 105(a)-affirmatively stating that "[a]ll placements of Indian chil-
dren shall seek to protect the rights of Indian children as Indians and the rights of the Indian
community and tribe in having its children in its society," id.; 105(e)-infringing on the parents'
rights to place the Indian child in a home they request by stating that:
A placement preference expressed by the Indian child's parent or Indian custodian,
or a request that the consenting parent's identity remain confidential shall be consid-
ered so long as the placement is made with one of the persons or institutions listed in
subsections (b) or (c), or one of the exceptions contained in subsection (d) applies.
Id. at S18,536.
244. Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,533.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See generally 1978 Hearing, supra note 18; 1977 Hearing, supra note 2; 1974 Hearing,
supra note 2.
249. See generally In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 204-06, 643 P.2d 168,
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Section 4(5)(c),2 50 which defines an Indian child, would add the language
that "if a child is an infant he or she is considered to be part of a tribal
community if either parent is so considered." 25 ' In this section, the amend-
ments would resolve the disagreement between the state courts regarding the
existing Indian family theory by imputing an existing Indian relationship
with the tribe.25 2 Another provision of the amendments, section 102(a),
would clarify that an involuntary proceeding can involve a preadoptive or
adoptive placement as well as a foster care placement or termination of pa-
rental rights.
2 5 3
In addition, section 102(e)-(f) of the amendments would change the lan-
guage of section 1912(e)-(f)2 54 from "continued custody of the child" to
"custody of the child by the parent."'25 5 Once again, the amendments would
clarify the intent of Congress in enacting the ICWA by deleting language
that implies a requirement of an existing Indian family.
Finally, section 104(a) of the amendments2 56 would similarly clarify sec-
tion 1914.of the ICWA by utilizing a technical amendment. This amend-
ment would change the language from "any parent or Indian custodian from
whose custody such child was removed" '2 57 to "any parent, any Indian cus-
todian from whose custody such child was removed .... ,2" 8 By replacing
the "or" with a comma, the phrase "from whose custody such child was
removed" no longer modifies "parents." Thus, the change makes it clear
that the custody requirement does not apply to parents, thereby removing
any implication that an existing Indian family is required before the ICWA
applies.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress clearly intends that the only prerequisite to the operation of the
ICWA be the involvement of an Indian child in a child custody proceeding.
The Kansas, Oklahoma, and Indiana courts require another prerequisite: an
existing Indian family. These courts support this prerequisite by citing to
the legislative history and the language of the ICWA. However, they fail to
174-75 (1982), enforced sub nom. Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986).
250. Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,534.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See supra note 212.
255. Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,535.
256. Id.
257. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1982) (emphasis added).
258. Amendments, supra note 14, at S18,535.
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view the legislative history and the language of the ICWA as a whole, but
rather examine only selected pieces that support their position. Viewed as a
whole, the ICWA clearly includes the adoption of illegitimate Indian chil-
dren. Thus, the reasoning behind the assertion that a breakup of an existing
Indian family must occur as a result of the child custody proceeding before
the ICWA applies, is flawed. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in
Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage and Justice Kauger's dissenting opin-
ion in Adoption of Baby Boy D. most closely follow the intent of Congress in
holding that the ICWA applies to adoptions of illegitimate Indian children
voluntarily relinquished shortly after birth.
To date, however, the majority of the state courts follow the existing In-
dian family theory. To ensure that other courts follow Adoption of a Child
of Indian Heritage, Congress should enact the 1987 amendments that clarify
the original intent of Congress at the time of the ICWA enactment in 1978.
Because the Supreme Court's decision in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indi-
ans v. Holyfield did not directly address this issue, only enactment of these
amendments will resolve the split in the state courts and guarantee full im-
plementation of the original intent behind the ICWA unless the Court grants
certiorari to a case presenting this issue.
Michelle L. Lehmann
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